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1BSTRACT
Dividends seem to be more heavily taxed than capital gains. Why
then do corporations pay dividends rather than repurchasing shares or re-
taining earnings? Either corporations are not acting in the interests of
shareholders, or else shareholders desire dividends sufficiently for nontax
reasons to offset the tax effect.
In this paper, we measure the relative valuation of dividends and
capital gains in the stock market, using a variant of the capital asset
pricing model. We find that dividends are not valued differently system-
atically from capital gains. This finding is consistent with share price
maximizationbyfirms but inconsistent with the fact that most shareholders
payaheavier tax on dividends.
We also show that the relative value of dividends provides an
indirect measure of a marginal Tobin's q. The measured value of dividends
relative to capital gains tends to be higher during prosperous periods, as
is consistent with this interpretation. We hope that this time series on a
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-Giventhe much more favorable taxtreatmentof capital gains than
ofdividends,why do U.S. corporations pay dividends when most shareholders
oughtto prefer stock repurchase? This is a questionthat has long puzzled
thosewho have tried to useeconomic theory to predict the effect oftaxes
onthe financial and other decisions of corporations. If investors evaluated
securitiesthe way they "ought to," fir-rn managers attempting to madni.ze
shareholder wealth should—-because ofthe taxrules--be ledtoavoid dividends.
Yet U.S. individual income taxpayers reported an aggregate of $25 billion
dollars in dividends receivedi1976 ,afigure thatmaybe compared with
anestimatedaggregatecorporation profit (after interest payments and corporate
taxes)of $63billion.
Ifeconomic theory failsbysuch a margin to predict the effect of
existing taxes on individualandfirm behavior, the confidence one can have
in predictions derived on the same basis about alternative rules is
seriously eroded. The research reported on here suggests that the explanation of the
paradox of dividends is not to be found in non-maximizingbehavior on the
partof those controllingthefinancial policies of firms.Ourconclusion2.
is that the focus of attention, as far as this issue isconcerned,is best
directedtoward explaining the preferences of the shareholding population,
and our modellingof this side ofthemarketfor corporate securities suggests
thathere too the outcomes may be less at variance with mad.mizing behavior
than usually thought, even tald.ng into account onlytax considerations.
We approachthis question by developing and estimating a model of the
relative value of dividends and capital gains in the U.S. stock market.
The theory of portfolio choice we apply to the demand side of that market is
an adaptation of the standard capital asset pricing model, particularly as. modified
by Brennan L19701. Importantly if not solely for tax reasons, we expect to
find in the taxpayer population a distribution of preferences between returns
inthe formofdividendsand returns in theform of capital gains (increase
in asset price) Given their financial policies, corporations' shareswill
differ in the division of their yieldsbetween the two forms, and these
differenceswill betaken into account along withtherisk properties of the
sharesin the portfolio decisions of investors.
As we show in theformalderivation, asset market equilibrium will
generate a single rate of exchange between dividends and capital gains.
Nhile the capital gain equivalent to a dollar of dividends, which we denote
by a ,cannotbe observed directly, itcan be inferred from market data.
Estimatingais the principal objective of curempirical work.
According tothe theory the market a willbea weighted average of
individualshareholder a's, that is, of individual valuations of dividends
in terms of capital gains. Thus if, as is usually assumed, dividends are
alwaystaxed not less heavily than capital gains, and areusuallytaxed more
heavily, taxconsiderationsalone would imply a value of a less than one.3.
Afinding otherwise should cause us to reassess the tax consequences at the
shareholder level and to look for other reasons for valuing dividends.
On the supply side of the market for corporate shares, the theory
of the firm implies that in equilibrium the two forms of returns to share-
holders should be equally valued, that is,equal to one. Since we expect
theexchange market forshares to adjust very quicklyto changing conditions,
but firm policies to change slowly, this implies onlya tendency for the value
of atowardunity.
Our estimates of aindicatea cyclical pattern around one. Such a
pattern is consistent with the view that the values of dividends and capital
gains tend toward equality. That is, our empirical results do not cause
us to question the usefulness of shareholder wealth xna.dnd.zation in predicting
outcomes in the U.S. corporate sector. As note in the next section,
accepting this model allows us to draw conclusions from our estimates about
the time path of the value in the stock market of an incremental dollar of
real investment. In particular if corporate dividend policies are believed
to adjust sufficiently rapidly to changing circumstances, Bradford-Gordon
a can be taken as an estimate of a marginal Tobin's q. Potential usesof
this are discussed in the concluding section of thepaper.
Since the empirical results are consistent with the theory of the firm
they are inconsistent withthe view that dividends and capital gains are
valued purely for their net of tax cash flow consequences, assumingdividends
arerelatively heavily taxed. Perhaps what is involved is an irrational
preference for dividends, as has been suggested by Black L1976 •Other
rational grounds seem worth investigating, suchasthe possibility, explored
by Battacharya L19791, thatdividends serve a signalling function. concerning
the future profitability of the firm.We do notpursuethis investigation4.
here, although we do note in the next section a frequently neglected class
of shareholders for which dividends are less heavily taxed than capital gains.
The next section, Section I, presents certain institutional and
theoretical background relevant to the interpretation of the empirical
analysis. Section II describes the model of equilibrium share valuation, the
estimation of which is the subject of Section III. Section IV contai.ns the
results of estimation and the paper concludes w.th a brief summing up and
commentary in Section V.5.
I.Institutional and Theoretical Background
In this section we firstbriefly reviewthe concepts of dividends and
capital gains, and the tax treatment thereof, as these bear on the evaluation
bydemanders of common stock.1 We then summarize theimplications of the
theoryof the firm for the behavior of suppliers of conmion stock.
Dividends, Capital Gains,andTheir Tax Consequences
The term "capital gain" as used in TJ.S.tax lawis related to a
transactionof sale or exc.hangeof a "capital asset," as defined in the law.
We use the term to refer simply to the increa.se in market value of an asset
overa specifiedti period. It is thus unrelatedto transactions. The
equivalence between capital gains anddividends(which are cash distributions
from a corporation to its shareholders)2 is, however, dependent on transactions.
Thecrucial point is that, in the absence of taxes andtransactions costs, it
ispossible to produce precisely the same consequences by dividends and by
share repurchase by the corporation. Both operations can be used to transfer
funds out of the corporation. By entering the market to sell, shareholders
can obtain the same cash flow in the repurchase case as would be provided
by dividends.Byentering the market to buy, recipients of dividends who
prefer an increased ownership interest can reproduce the effect of declining
to sell shares to the corporation in a disbursement of corporate funds by
sharerepurchase. The ownership claim remaining in the shareholder aftereither
transaction is the same. It is important to understand the equivalence of
the two, since it explains the econost's conviction that the value of the
corporation should be the same after disbursement of a given amount of funds
by either form)
Because there are transactions costs andbecause the taxconsequences
are very different, the expectation that future disbursementsof corporate
funds will take one or the other formshould havea bearing on its current value.6.
The relevant tax rules provide in the case of individual (rather than
corporate) shareholders (a) the first$100($200 formarried couplesfiling
jointly)of dividends areexcluded fromincome tax;(b)further dividends are
taxedas "ordinary" income (like interest receipts); (c) accruing capital
gains induce no current taxliability,(d) the taxation of capital gains
"realized" by sale depends upon the period over which the asset has been held,
with short term gainstaxedas ordinary income, butwithonly 40 percent of
long term gains(assetheldayear or more) subjected to taxasordinary
income.4These features imply that taxpayers withhigh marginal
ratesof tax on ordinary income and little use for current cash flow
should strongly prefer accruing capital gains to dividend yield For taxpayers
with zero or low marginal tax rates, transactions costs might be expected to
playa more important role, with those wishing a steady flow of cashfavoring
dividends.In general one mightexpectthe preferences of wealthy, highly
taxed, individualshareholdersfor capital gains to be the dominant inIluence
on individual valuation of corporate shares.
For shareholders other than individuals,an attitude ranging from
neutrality between capital gains and dividends to a preference for dividends
is implied by taxconsiderations.6Obviously, for taxexemptshareholders,
suchaspension fuis, taxconsequencesare irrelevant, and matters of
transactions costs and institutional features such as the rules limiting
auniversity's cash draw on its endowment to "income" (often defined to
exclude capital gains) may be the principal determinant of preferences. For
shareholders that are themselves taxable corporations taxconsiderationsare
in favor of dividends. This is because 85percent(100 percent in the case
of a sufficient ownership interest) of dividends received are excluded from
corporation income tax. This implies a tax rate in the typical case7.
of.15x.46or 6.9 percent. Realized capital gains, on the other hand,are
taxedat a flat 28 percent.7Whiletheadvantages of deferral of taxliability
and the f1ed.bility to choose the timing of cash flow, associated with
capital gains, apply to corporate as well as individual shareholders, still
taxable corporation shareholdersshould be expected typically to prefer
dividends. Thus implications of taxrules forthe preferences of
potential shareholders between capital gains and dividends are not as
unambiguously in favor of capital gains as is commonly believed. It appears
possible that investors favoring dividends could be sufficiently influential
to induce a temporary equilibrium value of a in excess of one.8
Implications of the Theory of the Firm for Dividend Policy
We turn next to the question of how the decisions of an individual
firm will be related toits perception of the value of a implicit in the
stock market. Specifically we consider three margins of choice: (1) that
between retentions anddividends,(2) that between real investment and other
usesof corporate funds, and(3)thatbetween issuing (orretiring) debt
or equity. In addressing these issues we assume the objective of the firm is
to xnadjnizethevalue of its shares.9
Itfollows that dividend policy will be set to bring about equality
between a andtheincrease in per share market value consequent upon an
extra dollar of retentions. If the market valued a flow of retentions at
less than a per dollar, the value of the shares could beincreased by
convertingthe flowofretentions to a flow of dividends, whiledividends
wouldbe reduced if the market valued retentions at more thana8.
Ifthefirmxnakes use of retained funds to mad.rnize shareholderwealth,
thestock market valuation of an incremental dollarofreal investment must
alsobe a(as long asreal investmentisamongthebest uses of retentions).
Therefore, on the assumption that firmsaresetting dividend policy
optimally, represents a marginalTobin's q (the market value of an extra
unitof capital relative to cost))0 Becauseit is a marginalratherthan
an average value (market value of the firm relative toreplacement cost) as
usuallycalculated, itought to be more useful in analyzing firm investment
behavior and financial structure)
We have concluded so far that when the dividendpayout rate is optimal
a equals the value of a dollar of retentions,which also normally equals
the value of a dollar of real investment. Howeverthe firmcannot bein
long term equilibrium if a is different fromone. A value of a greater
than one implies the opportunity forprofitable arbitrage between equity issue
and the uses of new fund to retire debt (or purchase the debt of other
firms) or to undertake real investment. Ifa is less than one the advantage
shifts todebt finance, ji.th the funds used to retireequity claims.129.
II. Taxes, portfolio choice, and the relativevaluation of dividends and
capital gains.
Ashas beensuggested in theprecedingsection,the relativevaluation
of dividends and capital gains in the market willbe the net consequence of
theportfolio choices of manyseparatewealth-holders, here collectively
labeleduhouseholds.hI To study this we modify thestandard analysisof
portfoliochoice to incorporate preferences between the twoforms of returns.
Thus, while we assume asusualthat the household seeks to allocate its
wealthamongthe available securities in the market toniad.mize a function
••2)of the mean.i.andthe variance .2 oftheone-period real
returnon the portfolio, wetakeexplicit coguizance of the fact that the
return in question is aweightedsum of dividends and capitalgains.
IndividualPortfolio Opt imality Conditions
Let ditdenote the dividends receivedon a dollar'sworth of the
i'th assetduring period t ,and the increase in its market value
overthe period. The real after tax dollarvalue of the return on a share
of equity in firm i to household hin period t is a weighted sum
of rt and dit, less the rate ofinflation,ff ,overthe period:
(1)Rt = d.t -
wherethe a 's capture tax and possibly otherpreference and signalling
elements. Lettingfhrepresent this household's utility function of
portfolio mean and variance and for the momentsuppressing the time subscript,








wherea bar over a random variable denotes itssubjective expected value, wh
denotesthe household's wealth to be allocated, andthe asset subscripts
ru.nover the set of securities available in the market.Note that wehave
notconstrained xtobe positive, implyingthepossibility of short sales.
For the nextstepswe shallfocuson the single household, so where no
ambigutyresults we simplify notation bysuppressingthe identifying
householdindex, h .Firstorder conditions associated with a solution to
problem (2) may then be written
(3)f1•R.+2f2Ex. Coy (R.,R.)=A•i1,...
whereAis theLagrangian multiplier onthe wealth constraint. These
conditionsimply in particular that for an asset z having,zero covariance
with the portfolio
(4) f. A,
andhence we may re-write(3)as
21'
(). - R -—Ex.Coy (P..,R.) 1 z 1'.j 1II.





















To remind us of potential aggregation problems,householdindices
have been included in equation (8), which can be thoughtof asa statevient
about the risk premium on diZferent assets expressed in capital gains
equivalents.For example, the relative weight, ,placedon dividends
depends upon household preferences and circumstances. The optimizing portfolio,
indexed h ,isdependent upon the household, as is, therefore, the zero-
covariance asset. In fact, even the expectations concerning the means and
covariances ofthe returns mightvarybyhousehold. Since wehave no hope
ofgaining thisdetailed information foreachhousehold, we I?rast make some12.
aumptj.onsaboutsi.ndlarjtjes of househo]so thatwecan derive an
aggregate relationshipamong asset characteristics
Market EquilibriumDerivedfromIndividualOptindation
Black (].972) shows thatequation (8) canbeaggregated, yielding an
equation relating thereturnson each security with thoseof the market
portfolio, under the following
assumptions: 1) the relativeweight,
ondividers i3 the sane
across households, and 2)expectations concerning
the means and covariances
of returns are identical
and rational, implying
that theactualvalues of eachcorrespond with expectations
To assume that all
households share acolnxnonvalueof
,however,is to suppress an important
aspectofthe reality we are
examining__the differences,especjauydue to
differenttaxsit1.ions,jn evaluation ofdividends and capitalgains.
Fortunately,we can relax thisassumption1 Equation (8)may- berewritten as
(9) ( 2h=ov(r. +crhd.-
7r/o, rh+d -
/ h Varr+d-t 1ct where —
Ifdividendsandinflation arebothnon-stochastic the righthandside of (9)
becomes simplyCcv(r ,rh)Consider the weightedsum of these
covariances, there the weightsare ,definedto be the ratio of the
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Forthe special case of the i'th asset being itself themarket portfolio
(12) implies
(13)i - yVar(r)
Thjsallows usto replace Vin (12) to obtain arelationship between expectations





Eventhough equation (14) no longer dependson h, it stillpresents
anestimation problem in that expectationsconcerning rates of returnare not
direcly observable, only the actualoutcomes. Ecwever, the definition ofa
covariance implies that were we tosample repeatedly from the subjective
joint probability distribution forr and rm ,theresulting observations
wouldsatisfy14.
— Cov(r.,r )
(15)r. -r.= 1 fl(r-j)+ 1 1 Var(r) m m 1 m
where isa random variable with zero expected value anduncorrelated
with rm-r.Withrational expectations, the actual outcomes will also
satisfy(15). t1henthe returns are joint normally distributed, as has
implicitly been assumed in motivating (2),willbe normally distributed.
Now use equation (14) to replacer in (15) by properties of the
13
portfolio and zero-covariance asset:
(16) r. +a - =
.(r+_ ) +i
Cov(r.,r ) 1111 where
j Var(r)
The unobserved parameters in this equation are a, ,and .The
entire derivation was for a given date. At other dates, the equation will
have a similar form, but the parameters may allbe different.
We then have (17) asa specification:
(17)r.t +ait -ztBit(rmt +adt- +it
This isthe firstspecificationto be estimated in section IV,
Note that in this specification, a does not vary with i.According
tothe derivation, all firms willface the samerelativevalue in the market
fortheir dividends and capital gains, in spite of the fact that their
shareholders may have very different characteristics. This result is
contraryto that in Elton andGruber (1970).15.
In addition, it follows fromequation(6) that ç2h=-f1/f2.Thisimplies
thattheweight given to each ah inderivinga is not only proportional
to thesize of that investor's portfolio but only inversely proportional to
themarginal degree of riskaversion of that investor. In particular,
were any investor risk neutral, his ah would receive infinite weight.
Refinements of the Estimating Equation
As has been noted in the derivation, specification (16) isimplied
whenboth dividendsand inflation are nonstochastjc.As we shall employmonthly
observations in the estimations, the assumption that dividends are 1own for the period
ahead does not seem extreme, but itisless plausible that the inflationrate can
beforecast .th confidence. If only dividends arenonstochastic,then the
aggregation of individualequilibri.imconditions produces a somewhat less
h h neatspecification. The right hand side of (9)now becomesCov(r.- n/a1,rh -
Bya derivation ana.z.agous to that leading toequation (12) we now find




As in (13), use the special caseof i=rntoeliminate the parameter v,giving
(Cov(r.,r)+3 )
(19).+ ______________
1 Var(r)+( +a-j) in in in in
Ain(15),usethe definition of a covariance and (19) toproduce
Var(r) (20) r. ad. - =(r+(a-) in —
111 1 1 zi in Var(r)+3-r Var(r)+') in in m in (+-) + in
-iVar(r)+ +
in in
S.(r +a* _*)+ 3*+ 1 in zi i16.
where a* candiffer arbitrarily from a.Thisspecification, with
a,a,, ath8 allvarying 'withtime, is estimated in section IV.
Note that when 8 'varieswith time,neither norg can be
estimated--only their combined effect with6 ie identified.
If is small relative to Var(r), as seems plausible, then the
only major difference between (17) and(20)is that in (20) thereis a firm
specificintercept, whichmightvaryover time. For =0this yields





Again, is not separately identified when 8
itis also estimated,
so is arbitrarily set to zero.
If we assume a is equal to one for allhouseholds, not a bad
assumptionexcept for corporate holders, then the right hand side of (18)
becomes YCov(r. -i, rmit)4Usingthe same procedure as before, this implies
(22) r. -it+ad -z i(rm_it÷cxi-(.-t)) +
Thisdiffers from (18) in that the capital gainsare measured in real terms,
and the zero beta rate, as estimated, isa real return rather than a ncnnal
return. Equation (22) is also estimated in sectionIV.
Returning again to equation (9), what if dividendsare also stochastic?
Wenow find
(23) •R+ a1 -
YLCov(rj,rm)+8 J
where6 E [Cov(r.,dh -itp) + C(d1
-it/,rh)+Cov(d.ffp1itph)17.
Sinceequations (23) and (18) have the same structure, equation (23) would also
imply the estimation specifications (20) and (21), with and suitably
redefined.
If we again assume equalsone for all households, we now find
using thesamederivation
Var(r-r) — (24)r -rc+-(j- )( r-+(aa-j)var(r-n )+ - m
m m Var(r -ff)+ In In rd -g
+:
Ifl 171 Z+ • 1
Var(r-.,1)
1
where =5"LCov(r.-rt, ahdh) + Co(a'd,rhrt) +Cov(a'd., ahd)1
Itseems very plausible that is smallrelativeto Var(r_Tt), so the only
real difference between equations (22) and(24)is the addition ofafirm
specificconstant term. This equation with '=0 is also-estimatedin sectionIV.
The derivation above made use of two strong assumptions: 1)thereis
norestriction on short sales and 2) expectations of households are identical.
How sensitive is the specification to these assumptions?
Assume shor.t salesare not possible,asan extremealternative. It is
not even clear that the constraint will be binding formany investors. When
a risk—free asset exists and all households have the same a h,they all willhold18.
a proportionalshare ofthemarket portfolio. A household's optimal portfolio
willbe a continuous function of all, so we expect that a1'will have to
vary substantially from the "average" valueifth household's desired
holding of any security is to be negative. If the a do vary that




withan inequality only when the short sales constraintis binding. Let us
rewrite(25) as (26), where e >0
(26)
Were we to use equation (26) rather than equation (9) in theprevious
derivation, the only difference would be that there wouldbe an additional
,.,hhh
term e. = e on the left hand side. However,this termis just
s1'
afirmspecificintercept,whichalreadyexists inmany of the previous
specifications. We merely need to reinterpret itwhena shortsales constraint
exists.
4hat ifindividuals have different expectations about r ,butnot
aboutCov(r.a1'd.-/a, -it/a)?Williams (1977)argues
for theplausibility of this set of assumptions. In rederiving equation (12),
rwould be replaced by
3hç2hh
h
.Inorder to be able to estimate the rederived equation, we would
s1'c
1'19.
want to assume that this expression is consistent withactualoutcomes. While
previously we assumed that each was consistent withactualoutcomes,
allwe need is that this weighted averageis consistent, a much weaker
rationalityassuxption than before.- 20.
III.Estimation procedure.
In the previous section,we derived a series of specifications, for
whichequation(17) is representative. In this section, we first discuss
furtherspecific assumptionswhich must bemade before the equation can be
estimated. We then describe the data and the estimation procedure.
Further specification assumptions
In equation (17), the unobserved parameters are a and
Assumptions dealing witheachof these will be described in turn.
aitOur derivation implies that a should not vary across assets but could
vary across ti.me, as the tax law and the wealth distribution change, as well
as the size of any transactions costs and the importance of institutional
constraintsfavoring dividends. To capture this smooth evolution of a over
time, we normally assume that at is piecewiselinear in t withbreak
pointsevery five years. For purposes of comparison withrelated work by
BlackandScholes (1974) and Litzenberger and Iamaswazny (1979) (hereafter B-S
andL-R),we also estimate a specification in which ais constant over time
(exceptthat for comparability with L-R we constrain a to equal oneprior
to the 'normal" taxation of dividends in 1936).
InL-R, is implicitly set equal to a +art where rft is an
observed interest rate on short term high grade bonds. But because of inflation
risk or default risk (when the series is for nongovernment bonds), the real
yield on these assets is not variance free. Presumably the stochastic movement
in these assets is positively correlated withthat ofthe market portfolio,
as both respond inversely to inflationary shocks. Therefore the zero beta
rateoughtto be less than a rf,andto a larger degree when the inflation21.
rate is highonthe assuition that the variance in the inflationrate is
highwhenthe in.fJ.ation rate is high. Therefore, we set =a+br1
'there
weexpect b < .Sincetherelation betweenand rmaychange over
time,we also let "a" be a piecewise linear function of time.
it We assume thatthe for afirm may driftsmoothlyover time, sotreat
the$ for each firm as a piecewise linear functionof time, with breakpoints
everyfive years. The coefficients of this linear functionare estimated
simultaneously with the others. In contrast, in B-sandL-R, ashasbeen
standardin papers estimating a capital asset pricing model,is estimated
from the previous five years or so of data,using the regression:
r. +d.t-rftj(rm +d-rft)+a+sit'Then is used as an independent
variable in the final regression for the other coefficients.There are
at least three problems with this approach.
First, the specification of the regression for assumes a =1and
= .Neitheris a maintained assumption inequation (17). Sincethe
purpose of the paper is to estimate a,assuingit equal to one at an
earlier step creates an internal inconsistency in themodel. Simultaneous
estimation of the parameters eliminates thisinconsistency.
Second, the estimate of in the previous work refers to theaverage
during the previous five years. Since drifts over time, and people
at the time likely observed this drift throughdaily observation or through
specific IQiowledge about changes in the characteristics of thefirm, the
estimated will have measurement error beyond thatappearing in the
standarderror of.L-Rattempt to correct for the latter measurement
error only. Conventional procedures for estimating capital assetpricing
models have not worried about the first. Thismeasurement error willcause
bias in all coefficients.22.
Inthis paper we estimate si.multaneously with theothercoefficient s,
soavoid problems withbiasdue to measurementerror.Also, we allow for the
drift in the value of over timeinapiecewise linear fashion. This
procedure implies that the estimate of for a year depends on subsequent
as well as earlier data. We assume that individuals at the time}ciewmuch
moreabout the firmthanwecan infer from monthly pricedata, soare not
botheredby this implication. In effect, we assume rationalexpectations--
thatindividuals know the parameters of the system,though not the stochastic
element.
Third,the requirement that be estimated on prior data results in the
loss of Live years of data from the sample, with clearefficiency costs.
L-R assumed that var(€ it = and00(Eit' jT)
=0,ij or t
inestimating the coefficients andinconstructing the standard errors. We
maintainL-R's stochastic assumption)4
T4hen other coefficients are added, suchas .anda *, eachis —--—-.— it t
assumed to be a piecewise linear function of time.
Data construction
Most of the data for this project come from themonthly returns file
compiled at the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) at the
University of Chicago. This data set provides monthly rates ofprice change
and dividend yields on all securities tradedon the New York Stock Exchange
between 1926 arid 1978.22.
begiming of the current period price, therate o± capital gains on that
stockin the pastyear,rmt ,dt
'rft
,anda constant. The forecasts
from theregressions arethenused instead of dtt
InL-R, when the amount ofthe dividend wasnotannouncedpriorto
thebeginning of the period, the previous dividendpayment was used as a
proxy if the dividend was a recurring dividend, elsezero was used as a proxy.
If dividends tend to be increasing indollar terms, then both of these
prod.es tend systematically to. underestimateactual dividends. Such systematic
errors will create biases in the coefficients.Also, L—R assume that the
investor alwaysIaowsin which month a periodic dividendwill be paid, an
assumption not imposed here.
rft A monthly time series for a high grade interest rate was kindly
provided tous by KrishnaPamaswamy through 1977, so isthe sameseriesused
in L-R. It consists of the interest
rate on covercia1 paper prior to 1951
and the rate on Treasury bills withone month to maturitysincethen. For
1978 we use the Treasury bill rateas reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
rmt,dmtThe rate of return on the marketportfolio ought to be the value
weighted average returnonall assets, not justthosetraded on the New York
Stock Exchange.However,as done in most all previouspapers in the area, we
Use thevalue-weighted average capital gains rateanddividendyield for just
NYSEsecuritiesin most of the peci.fjcatjons.However, in onespecification
we try to improve on this. If we hadtheaverage rate of return on each
type of security, denominated in thecapital gains equivalent, then the market
return would be the value weightedaverage of these, or Rm = E9 .R.
j=1
Inadditiontodata onequity returns, we employedmonthly timeseries on
two othertypesof assets:corporate bond yields, r
,f'omThbotson and 17 bt
Sinquefield [1977], and, as aproxy for the rate of return on real
estate,23.
A in L-R, but in contrast to many other recent papers, we use the
firm as unit ofobservation rather thanspeciallyconstructed portfolios
of securities. The justification in B-S for using portfolios rather than
individualsecurities is apparently 1) to xnini.nze measurement error in
and 2) to mininize correlation in the residuals across observations at
anydate.In our context, the first reason is moot, as .ia parameter,
not a datum. Even given the second point, the coefficients ought to be
estimatedmore efficiently by01.3onthe individual data than by OLS on the
portfoliodata.5
Giventhe decision to use firmdata,we next consider the problem of
measuringeach ofthe needed variables, r.t, 1' rft ,r,
and
appropriately.
r±tThis series is directly available forallNewYork Stock cchange
securitieson the CRSP monthly returns file.
We used the inflation rate derived from the consumer price index,as
reportedin Ibbotson and Sinquefield Ll977.
The dividend yield is also available monthly on the CRSP tape. When
dividends are stochastic, however, we need expected, not actual, dividends.
We therefore create an instrument for dt, anduseit even in the
speci.ficatinnswhere d1t is assumed to be nonstochastic, to nni.mize possible
specification error.
Increating the instrument, we divide the sample into four subsamples.
The classification of each observation depends on whether in the past year
the firm had paid no dividends, onedividend,two dividends, or more than
twodividends. Within eachsubsample, weregress actual dividend yield onthe
recent dollar dividends (corrected for stock splits) eachdividedby the23.
the inflation rate. The weighted average of these returns (with weights to
be esti.znated) is substituted for the market return in equation (20) to
obtain the additional specification18





There is no unique optimal parameter set as the equation stands. However, if
we make the arbitrary restrictions =1and g =0,then there is a
unique optimal set.
Estimationtechnique






Thisspecification is nonlinearinthe parameters,a,a,arid b.
Weuse nonlinear least squares (equivalent to ma.d.riuiii likelihounder the
assutionthat the errors are distributed normally). Thispresentsthe
izrmiediate problem that a large number of parametersareinvolved. The
procedure we followisto estimate 1)S conditional on initial estimates
of a ,a,and b (a= b=1,a0), using separate least squaresregressions
for each firm;2) a ,a,and bconditional on these using a pooled
regression, andthenreturn to step 1) withthenew estimates of a, a ,arid
band continue to iterate between steps 1) and 2) until convergence.
That the pointof convergence unuxnizes the sumof squared residuals
is iimnediate. In the firstorder conditionsfor this niini.nization, the
functionis z.ni.zed with respectto each parameterconditional onthe other24.
parameters.Inthe procedure describedabove,the setof parameters is
subdividedinto two groups, and the function is minimized with respect to
eachgroup conditional on the va]es of the other group. Whenthe function
isbeingjointly minimized,the entire set of firstorderconditions must be
satisfied. It shou.ldbenoted that the procedure used in L-R and B-S involves
stoppingthisiterative procedure after one iteration rather than iterating
untilconvergence.
Onecomplicationis that the standarderrorsof the parameters are
not the standard errors reported by either regression.For the simplest
model, where a did not depend on time, we report the madmum likelihood
standard errors, as approd.mated by the square root of the diagonal elements
in the inverse of the second derivative matrix of the log likeliho function
with respect to the parameters. Since these estimates, as reported below,
differed only slightly fromthe standarderrors for the second regression,
we report only the latter in the rest of our results.
Allowingeach of the parameters to be piecewise linear in time presents
nofurther complications. When it and/orare estimated, as in equation
(27), the only modification is that bothitand it are estimated in
the first regression, while a andare estimated in the second
regression. Asming heteroskedasticity in the residuals across firms causes
afew modifications. Since the residuals in each first stage regression for
rexnai.n homoskedastic and independent across regressions, this step is
unchanged.The varianceof the residual for each firm is estimated fromthe
residualsin each ofthese regressions. Theestimates of the variances
are then used in constructing weighted least squares estimates for the second
stage regression. The coefficients, andnow variance estimates,are iterated
until convergence.25.
IV.Coefficient estimates
The first step in the estimation process was to construct a forecasted
value for dividends. As described before, the overall sample was divided
into four subzanxples, based on the number of dividend payments during the
previous year. The resulting estimates for the four subsa.mples are reported
in Table 1. The coefficients are all reasonably plausible.
These equations were then used to create forecasts for the dividend
yield. As a result, the first year of data was dropped from later samples,
as it was needed to construct fitted dividends. After dropping in
addition observations with .ssing data and firms with too few observations
to allow estimation of sit' 6JJi,15Oobservationswere left. Initial
estimation was done on this sample.
The first specification estimated corresponds to equation (17) with
at
=aand =a+brft .Thisspecification is similar to that estimated
in L—R, though theyassuidb =aand performed only one iteration, as
described above. We estimate atobe .82, which is statistically significantly
less than one, and corresponds to the estimate in L-R of .76 .However,
b is estimated to be less than zero and substantially 1es than a .This
puts into question the use of rf as an approd.mation to the risk-free rate.
Theproblem, however, could well be the importance of firmspecific intercepts,
asrationalized above,which are capturedhere in the estimates of a and b
The standarderrorestimates arefoundin coluirs 2 and3.Herewe find that
the OLS standard errors, while they are systematicunderestimates because they
ignore that is being estimated simultaneously, still arereasonablyclose
tothe maximum likelihood estimates.26.
Inallotherspecifications estimated, we aJ.lowedato be a piecewise
linear function of time.Theestimates for a at thebreakpointsfor all the
otherspecifications are reported in Table 3.Theimplied value of afor
any other date is calctJ.ated by taking an appropriatelyweighted average of
the estimated values of a at the twonearestdates, e.g. the value in
December 1953inthe firstspecificationis .6 (1.28) +•1t. (.96).The
reported standard errors arethosefrom the second stage OLSregression.
Thetimepatternof a ,thoughvaryingsomewhatamong the different
specifications, consistently follows the economiccycles very closely. It is
lowest duringthegreat depression through the end of World War U andis
almostaslow duringthegreat recession ofthe early 70's. During theboom
yearsofthe 20 'sandthe50's through the iv±d-60's, it wasabove one virtually
throughout,it isalsovery high in 1978, suggesting a
favorable forecast for the future.
Estimatesmadeassuming a constantthroughouttheperiod ar very
misleading,sincethe estimates will bevery sensitive to the period chosen.
B-S estimate a and its
variance essentially by taking themean andvariance
ofannualestimates ofa.Itis apparent from these resu1twhythestandard
errorof their estimate was solarge.
Ifoneaccepts the coefficients as theystand, they implythatdividends
are not systematically wervaJ.ued.In factthey are often overvalued.
That atendsto return to one, where dividends andcapitalgains are equally
valued, following shocks is consistent withshare price maximizing behavior
by the firm.Thisresultalsoimplies, however, that in the weightedaverage
of investor preferences dividends andcapital gains are equally valued. Tax
considerationsalone seem to lead us to expect thatdividends would be less
valued.Our empirical finding might beexplained either by nontax advantages27.
of dividends to individuals (e.g. lower transactions costs or signalling
implications),or by a sufficiently high relative weight placed onthe
preferences of institutionaland corporate shareholders who would prefer
dividends.
The cyclical pattern of the results is consistent with the marginal
Tobin's q interpretation of a, wherearepresentsthe value in the
market of an additional dollar of real investment in the firm. We find this
value to be sharply procycical as would be expected.Of particular
interest in this connection is the very lowvalueof a duringthedepression,
when corporate investment at the margin was apparently almost valueless.
Since a caninprinciple be measured arbitrarilyclose to the present,
thissuggests that the estimates could well prove to be a valuable forecaster
for the investment rate.
Let us nowexamine thespecifications individually. The estimates of
equation(17), the equation most sin.1ar to those inprevious studies, provides
a basis for comparison. The implied estimates for =
at+ ft for
selected dates are reported in Table 1.4., column 1. As estimates of the risk
free rate, they are not very plausible, fluctuating often between extreme
19
values.Our several justifications for including a firm specificintercept
mayprovidea rationalization £ or this.
Whenwe use real rather than nominal capital gains, corresponding to
equation (22), the value of the log likelihood function falls substantially.
The derivation of this specification required the additionalassumption that
a =1for all h .Wealready noted that this assumption is poor for
corporateholders of equity. The poorer statistical performance o± this
specification also suggests that this assumption may not be a good one. The28.
estimates for rin Table 4 from thisspecificationare nortnafly lover
than the previous ones in absolute value, as they ought to be, representing
a real rather than a nominal interest rate. However, they are really no
more plausible, again justifying including firm specific constants.
We therefore next estimated equation (21), wheretimevarying firm
specific intercepts are estimated simultaneously (though rf is omitted).
Here we allow for the possibility of stochastic inflation and dividends,
orshortsalesconstraints. The estimates of awhile changing rather
little, seem to change most in those periods when our earlier estimates
for rwereleast convincing. In those periods, wewouldexpect the
factorsjustifying the firm specific intercepts to be most important.
When we reesti.mate equation (21) using real rather than nominal capital
gains, as reported in column 4 of Table 3,weagain find that the log-
likelihood falls substantially. The data reject the simplifying assumption
=1.
In the next specification, equation (27), we try to improve on our
approximation to the return on themarketportfolio byaddingthe corporate
bond yield and the inflation rate, with estimated weights, to the market
yield. Theimpliedchanges in our estimates of a ,reportedin Table 3,
column5, are minimal. The weights on these additional factors, reported in
Table4, are .11and.17 respectively. Each coefficient ought to represent
the market value of that type of security relative to equity multiplied by
the "a" weightappropriate for that security, translating the actual returns
into the equivalent capital gains returns. tjnder this interpretation, the
coefficient of the corporate bond rate is quiteplausible.While currently,
themarket value of debt is over half the market value of equity, during most
of the sample period the value of debt was relatively much smaller. Were29.
the average value for the period .15,20the implied value of "a" for bonds
would be .73,aplausible value. While we have littleevidence on the
relative value of real estate, theestimated coefficient for the inflation
rate does not seem grossly out of line.
In our final speci.t'jcatjon,equation (20), we no longer assume that
the uncertainty in inflation or dividendsis small relative to that oncapital
gains. Specifically, we estimate separateweights for market dividends
and for ixi.vidua1 firm dividends. Thelatter, which correspondto our
previousestimates, cluster more tightlyarow one throughout the sample
periodthoughtheycontinue to have the same cyclical timepattern.We
arguedinsectionithat these coefficients mightbeinterpreted as estimates
of the market value of a dollar of
additional real investment. These final
estimatesof a give a very plausibleestimate for the timepatternof this
marginal Tobin's q ,whileour other estimates mightseema bit too erratic.
In addi tion, the log- likelihoodimproves substantially herecompared with
thatfor equation (21).
The estimates for a ,reportedin Table 4, arelesscongruent
with the predictions of thetheory. According to our derivation,a /a
represents var(r)/var(r)+3m. ,aninterpretation difficult to reconcile
with the estimates. However, theestimates seem to fluctuatearound plausible
values, rather than beingconsistently implausible. Since surelyour measure
of themarketrate of returnis subjectto error, when we allow a* to be
estimated separately, its coefficientwill be biased Upwards duringperiods
when the true market yieldishigher than the stock market yield and dowardswhen
the true market yield is lower.We might therefore infer thenature of the30.
truemarket yieldrelativeto the stock market yieldfromourestimates of
To explore further this explanation for the fluctuations in a*, we
introduced the corporate bond rate and the inflation rate as components of
rm in equation (21). t3xifortunately, the coefficients, not reported, changed
little, ar did not improve systematically. This suggests that there are
other important factors omitted from our measureofthe market rate of
return.
While we tez to favor this last specification, fortunately our
estimatesof the general timepatternof a seem quite insensitive to the
specification issues considered. Estimates derived from any of the
specificationshave the same economic implications, a comforting result if
we are to use the estimates forforecastingpurposes.31.
V.Conclusions
In this paper we have presented estimates of the relativevalue in
the U.S. stock market of dividends and capitalgains. We have concluded
that over the sample period (1926 to 1978) thecapital gain regarded by
themarket asequivalent to a dollar of dividends, denoted by a
,has
Thfloweda cyclical path around one. The pattern of movement hasroughly
paralleled that of the business cycle.
The estimates are based on a modification of thecapital asset pricing
model. Successive estimates are presented,relaxing a priori restrictions.
Weare able to incorporate stochastic dividends and inflation and to allow
for deviation between the returns on the stock market andthat on the
portfolio of all assets. In each case the empirical resultsare consistent
with expectations. In particular, the most refinedversion has not only by
far the highest value of the likelihood function, but alsothe most plausible
path of a
We interpret the tendency of a toone as consistent with a view
of the firm as mad.zing share value inmaking decisions about dividend
policy, real investment and financial structure. Animplication of this
view is that aisan estimate of the value in the market of incremental
real investment. The empirical results on the timepattern of a are
consistent with this implication.
While the estimated value of a is consistent withmaximizing behavior
by the firm, it is less clearly consistent withmad.mizing behavior by
investors. The market value of a is shon by thetheory to be a weighted
average of stockholdera's. The tax treatment of the two forms of returns32.
implies that individuals should have a 's less than one, and since the
greater part of coimuonstock is held by individuals one would expectthe
market equilibrium to be below one as long as a significant number offirms
continueto pay dividends.
We note, though, that the presence in the market of tax exempt holders
such as pension funds, and taxable corporationsfor iich dividendsare less
heavily taxed that capital gains, clouds this conclusion. As we show, the
weightattached to shareholders' a's is inversely related to their risk
aversion.Hence itis not out of the question, though certainly not
established,that an aof one isconsistent with mad.mi.zation generally,
takinginto account only tax issues.
However, it is less easy to reconcile the observed variation in a with
thisview. Our preferred estimate of arangesfrom .04 to 1.37, andthe
range even in the non-depression years is .70 to 1.37. This degree of
variation seems difficult to explain on the basis of differences in the
distribution of taxcircumstancesin the investing population.
Naturally, even as publicfinanceeconomists, we mustacknowledgethat
taxes niaynotexplain everything. Thedeterminantsofithivi.dualinvestors'
valuationof dividends is but one of the questions remaining open, and we
hope to follow up on some of these in further work. We see three related
avenues for such work.
The first is a closer look at the relationship between tax rules and
a .Overthe sample period, the individual income tax evolved from a
minorimpostaffectingfew individuals to a mass taxwith high rates.33.
Thetax treatmentofdividends, capitalgains, corporate retained earnings,
andretirement savingsalsovaried substantially. These changesought to
havemadea mark on a•
Second, the theory developed here impliesa response of the dividend
and other financial policies of individualfirms to changes in a.Roughly
speaking, high values of a should cail fortha shift from debt to equity
anddecreases in payout rates, andlow values should have the oppositeeffect.
To deal properly with thisrelationship wili requirea careful treatment of
the underlying reason for a change ina (e.g., change in tax rules vs.
change in general outlook for profits), and of thedeternants of the lag
structure of responses (due, for example, to thedifficulty of observing a).
The third idea of further work is therelationship between a and
therate of corporate real investment.Closely related to the investigation
of the response o±financialstructure, thisinvestigation will build on
theimplication of optimal firm behavior thata should be a measure of the
value in the market of a dollar ofadditional investment, a marginal Tobin's
q .Sincethe data are available almostirediately, a can be estimated
very close to the present. This suggests thatan estimated a may prove













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mad..mu Likelihood Estimates for Equation (17)
Coefficients Standard Errors
OLS LikeljJ200d
a .8238 .0191 .0207
a .0007 .0003 .0004
b -.6088 .0908 .1139
35.36.
Table3
Estimatesof the Time Pattern of a
Equation Number
Date (17) (22) (21) (24) (27) (20)
1.Dec., 1925 1.50 1.10 .93 1.09 .87 1.11
(.27) (.21) (.22) (.23)(.22) (.23)
2.Dec., 1930 -.11 -.10 .08 .04 .11 .04
(.09) (.o8) (.08) (.09)(.08) (.08)
3. Dec., 1935 .64 .56 .42 .39 .42 .34 (.10) (.10) (.08) (.08)(.08) (.09)
4. Dec., 1940 .10 .16 .23 .24 .23 .70
(.08) (.08) (.07) (.07)(.07) (.07)
5. Dec.,1945 .57 .55 .65 .64 .66 .71
(.lo) (.10) (.09) (.09)(.09) (.09)
6.Dec., 1950 .96 .97 .91 .92 .91 1.00
(.07) (.07) (.o6) (.06)(.06) (.06)
7.Dec., 1955 1.28 1.27 1.41 1.371.41 1.37 (.09) (.09) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.07)
8. Dec., 1960 1.37 1.30 1.23 1.261.23 1.20
(.10) (.10) (.08) (.07)(.08) (.09)
9.Dec., 1965 1.41 1.46 1.42 1.L40 1.45 1.21
(.10) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09)
10. Dec., 1970 .75 .75 .54 .55 .56 .72
(.09) (.09) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08)
U. Dec., 1974 .45 .45 .46 .43 .48 .88
(.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.06)
12. Dec., 1978 1.59 1.65 1.68 1.79 1.71 1.09
(.09) (.08) (.oi) (.02) (.01) (.05)
Log-Likelihood 652304 651704 658821 658363658900 659500















































































'The tax rules described beloware those currently in effect. They
are representative in a qualitative sense of the rules that were in effect
over the recent decades of the sample period of the empiricalwork,although
there have been important changes in the treatment of capital gains in the
individual income tax. The important fact about the early decades of the
sample is that the income taxaffectedvery few people.
2For simplicity we neglect here distributions ofproperty other than
cash. Stock dividends are treatedas a simple redefinition of the units of
omership, althoughin fact they do have some implications for the
corporation's books.
Bybuying for cash equity claims ofother corporations, a corporation
canaccomplishmuch thesame effect as repurchasing its on shares.Because
ofthe rules for taxation of intercorporate dividends (discussed inthe text),
this continues to be roughly true even in the presence of taxes.
Under some circumstances capital gains are subject to a special
"alternative sinimum tax," dth buttrivialconsequences for the effective
marginal rate. More important is the fact that if an asset is held to the
owner's death capital gain to that date goes free of income tax.
Toanalyze fully the taxtreatmentof capital gains it is necessary to take
account of future tax consequences via changes in "basis" of the shares omed
by the taxpayer. For details see Bradford [l98O.39.
6Thisdoesnot encompassirtitua1 funds, which serve as conduits for
shareho.ders.
7The 28'percent rate is an alternative tax. Since thecorporation
income tax is assessed on a graduated schedule, itwill be advantageous for
the firm totreat capital gainsasordinaryincome when total taxable profits
arelow enough. Note also that underrareconditions corporate capital gains
are subject to an additional"minimum tax."
we shall see below the influence of an agent onthe market a is
negativelyassociated with his risk aversion. Arguably, large institutional
investors,with relatively higha'sarealsorelatively riskneutral.
9
We are inclined to this even though, as King L 197'7J shows, mad.riization
of market value will not.in general be the preferred objective of allor
even the majority of stockholders. Without claiming to make the point
precisely, we conjecture that the deviation of firm behavior from thatimplied
by wealth maximization will be small in a large system such asthe U.S.
economy.As we have noted, our empirical results seemconsistentwith this view.
10
Cf. Tobin1969],Ciccolo [1975], or von Furstenberg [1977].
U
SeeGordon :1979]for further discussion.
12
Note that nnich the same effectas stock repurchase can be accomplished
by the take-over of othercorporations inapurchase involving cash,oreven
by the simple purchase of stock in the
market, taking advantage of the 85
percent dividend received deduction.If such repurchase of equity is ruled
out, however, as inBradford(1977),thenamayremain belowone even in
equilibrium.40.
That (16) follows directly from (14) and rationalexpectations seems
to have been overlooked in the financeliterature, e.g. Faina [1968J
14
When wemeasuredthe covariance in the residuals atany date among
firmsin the same industry, andamong firmsin different industries,we found
thatthe size of the covari.ance wasnormally about ten per cent of the
variance of the residual, implyinglittlebias in the reported standard errors.
a simplecase,assume N firmsper portfàlio and Iportfolios
ateach of T dates. Assume that the residuals allhave variance 2,
ile residuals for firms in the sameportfolio at any date have covariance
p.Assumeone independent variable for notational simplicity whoseaverage
squared value is x2 ,regardlessof firm or date. For any portfolio, where
the average of the independent variables for thecomponent firms becomes the
2 new independent var.able, assume itsaverage squared value to be p x
where 0 <p<1due to the averaging out of individualvariationamongfirms
ina portfolio. By solvingexplicitly for the variance of the coefficient
estimate u.nder each procedure, onecan show after some messy algebra that
the variance of the estimateonportfolio data is
2(ru)
2





2 It 1Sstra1gtIcr.7arato snow that NITx +p ((l-p)-1)
the latter is nnccssarily smailcr.L.l.
dividend yield wasused directly,without an instrument, since
itwas very stable over time.
171e have no breakdown hereinto interest payments andcapital gains.
Therefore, the average "a"forbonds will be incorporated into the Q weight
on bonds.
18An alternative rationalization for this specification, suggested to
usby Stephen Ross,involves assimiing three underlying stochastic factors,
f1, andf3 which jointly determine the return on all types of securities,
that is R. =V.f +Y..,f,, +V•f •R=V'+Vf +V£ 31 j33 mm.llxn22 m33





19Here,b sestimated to be -.3.Whileless than a,asexpected,
itis ilaus8b1y low, again rationalizing theuse offirmspecific intercepts.
20Gordori and MalkjeJ. 11979]find that since the late 1950's, the
debt equity ratio has grown steadily froma value in the late l950's of
about .18.42..
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